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Abstract
The paper considers the consensus problem in
a partially synchronous system with Byzantine pro-
cesses. In this context, the literature distinguishes (1)
authenticated Byzantine faults, where messages can
be signed by the sending process (with the assump-
tion that the signature cannot be forged by any other
process), and (2) Byzantine faults, where there is no
mechanism for signatures (but the receiver of a mes-
sage knows the identity of the sender). The paper
proposes an abstraction called weak interactive con-
sistency (WIC) that unifies consensus algorithms with
and without signed messages. WIC can be imple-
mented with and without signatures.
The power of WIC is illustrated on two seminal
Byzantine consensus algorithms: the Castro-Liskov
PBFT algorithm (no signatures) and the Martin-Alvisi
FaB Paxos algorithms (signatures). WIC allows a very
concise expression of these two algorithms. More-
over, using a implementation of WIC without signa-
tures allows us to derive a signature-free variant of
FaB Paxos.
Keywords: Distributed Algorithms, Consensus,
Byzantine Faults, Unification, Authentication.
1 Introduction
Consensus is probably the most fundamental prob-
lem in fault tolerant distributed computing. Consensus
is related to the implementation of state machine repli-
cation, atomic broadcast, group membership, etc. The
problem is defined over a set of processes Π, where
each process pi ∈ Π has an initial value vi, and re-
quires that all processes agree on a common value.
With respect to process faults, consensus can be
considered with different fault assumptions. On the
one end of the spectrum, processes fail only by crash-
ing (so called benign faults); on the other end, faulty
processes can exhibit an arbitrary (and even malicious)
behavior. Among the latter, two fault models are con-
sidered in literature [7]: (1) authenticated Byzantine
faults, where messages can be signed by the sending
process (with the assumption that the signature can-
not be forged by any other process), and (2) Byzan-
tine faults, where there is no mechanism for signatures
(but the receiver of a message knows the identity of
the sender).1 Consensus protocols that assume Byzan-
tine faults (without authentication) are harder to de-
velop and prove correct [16]. As a consequence, they
tend to be more complicated and harder to understand
than the protocols that assume authenticated Byzantine
faults, even when they are based on the same idea. The
existence of these two fault models raises the follow-
ing question: is there a way to transform an algorithm
for authenticated Byzantine faults into an algorithm for
Byzantine faults, or vice versa?
This question has been addressed by Srikanth and
Toueg in [16] for the Byzantine agreement problem,2
1In [10] the latter is called Byzantine faults with oral messages.
2In this problem, a transmitter sends a message to a set of pro-
cesses, all processes eventually deliver a single message, and (i)
all correct processes agree on the same message, (ii) if the trans-
mitter is correct, then all correct processes agree on the message
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by defining the authenticated broadcast primitive. Au-
thenticated broadcast is a communication primitive
that provides additional guarantees compared to, e.g.,
a normal (unreliable) broadcast. Srikanth and Toueg
solve Byzantine agreement using authenticated broad-
cast, and show that authenticated broadcast can be im-
plemented with and without signatures. However, au-
thenticated broadcast does not encapsulate all the pos-
sible uses of signed messages when solving consensus.
One typical example is the Fast Byzantine Paxos algo-
rithm [12], which relies on signed messages whenever
the coordinator changes.
Complementing the approach of [16], we define an
abstraction different from authenticated broadcast that
we call weak interactive consistency. 3 Interactive
consistency is defined in [14] as a problem where cor-
rect processes must agree on a vector such that the
ith element of this vector is the initial value of the
ith process if this process is correct. Our abstraction
is a weaker variant of interactive consistency, hence
the name “weak” interactive consistency. Similarly to
authenticated broadcast, weak interactive consistency
can be implemented with and without signatures. We
illustrate the power of weak interactive consistency
by reexamining two seminal Byzantine consensus al-
gorithms: the Castro-Liskov PBFT algorithm, which
does not use signatures [4], and the Martin-Alvisi
FaB Paxos algorithm, which relies on signatures [12].
We show how to express these two algorithms using
the weak interactive consistency abstraction, and call
these two algorithms CL (for Castro-Liskov), resp.
MA (for Martin-Alvisi).
Both CL and MA are very concise algorithms.
Moreover, replacing in CL weak interactive consis-
tency with a signature-free implementation basically
leads to the original signature-free PBFT algorithm,
while replacing in MA weak interactive consistency
with a signature-based implementation basically leads
to the original signature-based FaB Paxos algorithm.
In the latter case, the algorithm obtained is almost
identical to the original algorithm; in the former case,
of the transmitter.
3In [9], Lamport defines ”Weak Interactive Consistency Prob-
lem”, as a general problem of reaching agreement. In [6], Doudou
et al. define an abstraction called ”Weak Interactive Consistency”,
with a different definition than ours. They use this abstraction to
derive a state machine replication protocol resilient to authenti-
cated Byzantine faults.
the differences are slightly more important. In addi-
tion, using MA with a signature-free implementation
of WIC allows us to derive a signature-free variant of
FaB Paxos.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Weak interactive consistency is informally introduced
in Section 2. Section 3 defines our model, and formally
defines weak interactive consistency. In Section 4 we
show that weak interactive consistency can be imple-
mented with and without signatures. Section 5 de-
scribes the MA consensus algorithm (FaB Paxos ex-
pressed using weak interactive consistency) and the
CL consensus algorithm (PBFT expressed using weak
interactive consistency). Section 6 discusses related
work, and Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Weak interactive consistency: an informal
introduction
In order to introduce weak interactive consistency,
we start by addressing the question of the typical use of
signatures in coordinator based consensus algorithms,
together with the role of the coordinator.
2.1 On the use of signatures
We start by addressing the following question:
where are signatures used in coordinator based con-
sensus algorithms? Signatures are typically used each
time the coordinator changes, as done for example
in the FaB Paxos algorithm [12]. The corresponding
communication pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, and
addresses the following issue. Assume that the previ-
ous coordinator has brought the system into a configu-
ration where a process already decided v; in this case,
in order to ensure safety (i.e., agreement) the new co-
ordinator can only propose v. This is done as follows.
First every process sends its current estimate to the
new coordinator (vi sent by pi to p1 in Figure 1). Sec-
ond, if the coordinator p1 receives a quorum of mes-
sages, then p1 applies a function f that returns some
value x. The quorum ensures that if a process has al-
ready decided v, then f returns v. Finally, the value
returned by f is then sent to all (x sent by p1 in Fig-
ure 1).
This solution does not work with a Byzantine co-
ordinator: the value sent by the coordinator p1 might
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Figure 1. Coordinator change: p1 is the new
coordinator.
not be the value returned by f . Safety can here be en-
sured using signatures: Processes pi sign the estimates
vi sent to the coordinator p1, and p1 sends x together
with the quorum of signed estimates it received. This
allows a correct process pi, receiving x from p1, to ver-
ify whether x is consistent with the function f . If not,
then pi ignores x.
Are signatures mandatory here? We investigate this
question, first addressing safety and then liveness.
2.2 Safe updates requires neither signatures nor
a coordinator
As said, safety means that if a process has decided
v, and thus a quorum of processes had v as their esti-
mate at the beginning of the two rounds of Figure 1,
then each process can only update its estimate to v.
This property can be ensured without signatures and
without coordinator: each process pi simply sends vi
to all, and each process pi behaves like the coordina-
tor: if pi receives a quorum of messages, it updates its
estimate with the value returned by f .
This shows that updating the estimate maintaining
safety does not require a coordinator. However, as we
show in the next section, a coordinator is reintroduced
for liveness.
2.3 Coordinator for liveness
The coordinator in Figure 1 has two roles: (i) it en-
sures safety (using signatures), and (ii) it tries to bring
the system into a univalent configuration (if not yet
so), in order to ensure liveness (i.e., termination) of
the consensus algorithm. A configuration typically be-
comes v-valent as soon as a quorum of correct pro-
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Figure 2. Three rounds to get rid of signa-
tures when changing coordinator to p1 (in-
spired by [4])
cesses update their estimate to v. This is ensured by
a correct coordinator, if its message is received by a
quorum of correct processes. Ensuring that a quorum
of correct processes update their estimate to the same
value v can also be implemented without signatures
with an all-to-all communication schema, if all correct
processes receive the same set (of quorum size) of val-
ues. Indeed, if two correct processes apply f to the
same set of values, they update their estimate to the
same value.
However, ensuring that all correct processes receive
the same set of messages is problematic in the presence
of Byzantine processes: (i) a Byzantine process can
send v to some correct process pi and v′ to some other
correct process pj , and (ii) a Byzantine process can
send v to some correct process pi and nothing to some
other correct process pj .
These problems can be addressed using two all-to-
all rounds and one all-to-coordinator rounds, as shown
in Figure 2 (to be compared with the “init” round fol-
lowed by the “echo” round of authenticated broadcast,
see Figure 3). These three rounds can be seen as one
all-to-all super-round that “always” satisfies integrity
and “eventually” satisfies consistency:
• Integrity: If a correct process p receives v from
a correct process q in super-round r, then v was
sent by q in super-round r.
• Consistency: (i) If a correct process pi sends v
in super-round r, then every correct process re-
ceives v from pi in super-round r, and (ii) all cor-
rect processes receive the same set of messages in
super-round r.
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Figure 3. Two rounds to get rid of signatures
for authenticated broadcast [16].
As noted in Section 2.2, integrity ensures safety. As
noted at the beginning of this section, eventual consis-
tency allows us to eventually bring the system into a
univalent configuration, thus ensuring liveness.
In the scheme of Figure 2 we combine the concept
of a coordinator as depicted in Figure 1 with the au-
thentication scheme of Figure 3. This scheme provides
that in synchronous rounds (which eventually exist in
a partially synchronous model, see Section 3), mes-
sages received by a correct coordinator in the “for-
ward” round (see Figure 2), are received by all correct
processes in the “echo” round (see Figure 2). 4 Note
that without having the coordinator, the authentication
scheme of Figure 3 is not able to provide a super-round
such that all processes receive the same set of mes-
sages at the end of this super-round, since a Byzantine
process can always prevent this from happening.
We call the problem of always ensuring integrity
and eventually consistency the weak interactive con-
sistency problem, or simply WIC.5 We show below that
WIC is a unifying concept for Byzantine consensus al-
gorithms. WIC can be implemented with signatures in
two rounds (Figure 1), or without signatures in three
rounds (Figure 2), as shown in Section 4.
4The relay property of authenticated broadcast ensures that if a
messages is received by a correct process in some round r′, then it
is received by all correct processes the latest in round r′+1 in the
synchronous case.
5The relation with “interactive consistency” [14], is explained
in Section 1.
3 Model and definition of WIC
Assuming synchronous rounds is a strong assump-
tion that we do not want to consider here. On the other
side, an asynchronous system is not strong enough:
WIC is not implementable in such a system. We con-
sider a third option, i.e., a partially synchronous sys-
tem [7], or rather a slightly weaker variant of this
model: we assume that the system alternates be-
tween good periods (during which the system is syn-
chronous) and bad periods (during which the system is
asynchronous). As in [7], we consider an abstraction
on top of the system model, namely a round model, de-
fined next. Using this abstraction rather than the raw
system model improves the clarity of the algorithms
and simplifies the proofs.
Among the n processes in our system, we assume
that at most t are Byzantine. We do not make any as-
sumption about behavior of Byzantine processes. The
set of correct processes is denoted by C.
3.1 Basic round model
In each round r, a process p sends a message ac-
cording to a sending function Srp to a subset of pro-
cesses, and, at the end of this round, computes a new
state according to a transition function T rp , based on
the vector of messages it received and its current state.
Note that this implies that a message sent in round r
can only be received in round r (rounds are closed).
The state of process p in round r is denoted by srp;
the message sent by a correct6 process is denoted by
Srp(s
r
p); messages received by process p in round r are
denoted by ~µrp.
In every round of the basic round model, if a correct
process sends v, then every correct process receives v
or nothing. This can formally be expressed by the fol-
lowing predicate (⊥ represents no message reception):
Pint(r) ≡ ∀p, q ∈ C : (~µrp[q] = Srq (srq) )∨ (~µrp[q] = ⊥).
3.2 Characterizing a good period
During a bad period, except Pint , no guarantees on
the messages a process receives can be provided: it
6Note that referring to the state of a faulty process does not
make sense.
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can even happen that no messages at all are received.
During a good period it is possible to ensure, for all
rounds r in the good period, that all messages sent in
round r by a correct process are received in round r
by all correct processes. This is formally expressed by
the following predicate:
Pgood (r) ≡ ∀p, q ∈ C : ~µrp[q] = Srq (srq).
The reader can find in [7] the implementation of
rounds that satisfy Pgood during a good period in the
presence of Byzantine processes.
3.3 WIC predicate
We have informally defined WIC by an integrity
property and by a consistency property that must hold
“eventually”. The integrity property is expressed by
the predicate Pint . “Eventual” consistency formally
means that there exists a round r in which consistency
holds:
Pcons(r) ≡ ∀p, q ∈ C : (~µrp[q] = Srq (srq) )∧ (~µrp = ~µrq).
Therefore, WIC is formally expressed by the following
predicate:
∀r : Pint(r) ∧ ∃r : Pcons(r)
Note that Pcons(r) is stronger than Pgood (r). Con-
sider two correct processes p and q, and a Byzantine
process sending messagem to all processes in round r:
Pgood (r) allows m to be received by p and not by q;
Pcons(r) does not allow this.
4 Implementing WIC
For implementing WIC, we show in this section that
rounds that satisfy Pgood can be transformed into a
round that satisfies Pcons . This transformation can be
formally expressed thanks to the notion of predicate
translation. Given some round r, we say that an algo-
rithm A is a k-round translation of predicate P (e.g.,
Pgood ) into predicate P ′ (e.g., Pcons ), if round r con-
sists of k micro-rounds 〈r, 1〉 to 〈r, k〉 such that:
• P holds for each micro-round 〈r, i〉, i ∈ [1, k];
• Each process p execute A in each round 〈r, i〉,
i ∈ [1, k];
• For each process p, the message mp sent by p
in micro-round 〈r, 1〉 is the message sent by p in
round r;
• For each process p, the messages received by p in
round r are computed by p at the end of micro-
round 〈r, k〉;
• P ′ holds for round r.
We also say that round r is simulated by the k
micro-rounds 〈r, 1〉 to 〈r, k〉.
We give two translations, one with and one without
digital signatures. The two translations rely on a co-
ordinator. The translation with signatures requires two
micro-rounds with the communication pattern of Fig-
ure 1, whereas the translation without signatures re-
quires three micro-rounds with the communication
pattern of Figure 2 7. The coordinator of round r is
denoted by coord(r).
We will analyze the two translations in the follow-
ing cases: (i) coord(r) is correct and the micro-rounds
satisfy Pgood , and (ii) coord(r) is faulty and only Pint
holds for the micro-rounds. In case (i), we have a
translation of Pgood into Pcons . Case (ii) ensures that
the translation is harmless during bad periods, or with
a faulty coordinator.
Therefore, the big picture is the following. If we
assume a sufficient long good period, then [7] shows
how to implement rounds for which Pgood eventually
holds. Moreover, the rotating coordinator paradigm
eventually ensures rounds with a correct coordinator.
Together, this eventually ensures case (i).
4.1 Translation with signatures
Algorithm 1 is a 2-round translation with signatures
that preserves Pint (i.e., if Pint holds for every micro-
round, then Pint holds for the round). Moreover, when
coord(r) is correct, it translates Pgood into Pcons . At
the beginning of Algorithm 1 every process p has a
message mp (line 5); at the end every process p has a
vector ~Mp of received messages (lines 15, 19) 8. Vec-
tor receivedp (line 8) represents the messages that p re-
ceived (one element per process). Message m signed
7In Section 2 we used terms super-round and round. From here
on, we use term round for what we called super-round and micro-
round for what we called round.
8When round r is simulated using Algorithm 1, mp is initially
set to the Srp(srp) and in the end ~µrp is set to ~Mp.
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Algorithm 1 Translation with signatures
1: Initialization:
2: ∀q ∈ Π : receivedp[q]← ⊥
3: Round ρ = 〈r, 1〉:
4: Sρp :
5: send σp(mp, r) to coord(r)
6: T ρp :
7: if p = coord(r) then
8: receivedp ← ~µρp
9: Round ρ = 〈r, 2〉:
10: Sρp :
11: if p = coord(r) then
12: send receivedp to all
13: T ρp :
14: for all q ∈ Π do
15: ~Mp[q]← ⊥
16: if signature of ~µρp[coord(r)][q] is valid then
17: (msg, round)← σ−1(~µρp[coord(r)][q])
18: if round = r then
19: ~Mp[q]← msg
by p is denoted by σp(m). The function σ−1 allows us
to get back the original message out of a signed mes-
sage.
Algorithm 1 is straightforward: each process p
sends its signed messagemp to the coordinator (line 5)
in micro-round 〈r, 1〉. In micro-round 〈r, 2〉, the coor-
dinator forwards all messages received (line 12).
Proposition 1. Algorithm 1 preserves Pint(r).
Proof. Every process checks at lines 16 and 18
whether the signature and the round number of the
message are valid. Since signatures cannot be forged,
for all correct processes p, q, if ~Mp[q] is equal to
m 6= ⊥ at the end of micro-round 〈r, 2〉, then q has
sent m at the beginning of micro-round 〈r, 1〉.
Proposition 2. If coord(r) is correct, then Algo-
rithm 1 translates Pgood into Pcons .
Proof. Let assume thatPgood (〈r, 1〉) andPgood (〈r, 2〉)
hold and that coord(r) is correct. Since we have
Pgood (〈r, 1〉), the coord(r) receives in round 〈r, 1〉 the
message from all correct processes, and possibly from
some faulty processes. Since the coordinator is cor-
rect and we have Pgood (〈r, 2〉), all messages received
by the coordinator are forwarded in round 〈r, 2〉, and
received by all correct processes.
4.2 Translation without signatures
Algorithm 2 is a 3-round translation with signa-
tures, inspired by [4], that preserves Pint (i.e., if Pint
p1
p2
p3
p4
〈r, 1〉
v2
v2
v2
v2
〈r, 2〉 〈r, 3〉
Figure 4. Translation without signatures from
the point of view of v2 sent by p2 (p1 is the
coordinator).
holds for every micro-round, then Pint holds for the
round). Moreover, when coord(r) is correct, it trans-
lates Pgood into Pcons . It requires n ≥ 3t + 1. At
the beginning of Algorithm 2 every process p has a
message mp (line 7); at the end every process p has a
vector ~Mp of received messages (lines 22, 24) 9.
We informally explain Algorithm 2 using Figure 4.
Compared to Figure 2, Figure 4 shows only the mes-
sages relevant to v2 sent by p2. Process p1 is the coor-
dinator. In micro-round 〈r, 1〉, process p2 sends v2 to
all. In micro-round 〈r, 2〉, all processes send the value
received from p2 to the coordinator. The coordinator
then compares the value received from p2 in micro-
round 〈r, 1〉, say v2, with the value indirectly received
from the other processes. If at least 2t + 1 values
v2 have been received by the coordinator p1, then p1
keeps v2 as the value received from p2. Otherwise p1
sets the value received from p2 to ⊥. This guarantees
that, if p1 keeps v2, then at least t+1 correct processes
have received v2 from p2 in micro-round 〈r, 1〉.
Finally, in micro-round 〈r, 3〉 every process sends
the value received from p2 in micro-round 〈r, 1〉 to all.
The final value received from p2 at the end of micro-
round 〈r, 3〉 is computed as follows at each process pi.
Let vali be the value received by pi from coordinator
p1 in micro-round 〈r, 3〉. If vali is ⊥ then pi receives
⊥ from p2. Process pi receives ⊥ from p2 in another
case: if pi did not receive t + 1 values equal to vali
in micro-round 〈r, 3〉. Otherwise, at least t+ 1 values
received by pi in micro-round 〈r, 3〉 are equal to vali,
9When round r is simulated using Algorithm 2, mp is initially
set to the Srp(srp) and in the end ~µrp is set to ~Mp.
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Algorithm 2 Translation without signatures (n ≥ 3t+
1)
1: Initialization:
2: ∀q ∈ Π : receivedp[q]← ⊥
3: Round ρ = 〈r, 1〉:
4: Sρp :
5: send mp to all
6: T ρp :
7: receivedp ← ~µρp
8: Round ρ = 〈r, 2〉:
9: Sρp :
10: send receivedp to coord(r)
11: T ρp :
12: if p = coord(r) then
13: for all q ∈ Π do
14: if
∣∣{q′ ∈ Π : ~µρp[q′][q] = receivedp[q]}∣∣ < 2t+ 1 then
15: receivedp[q]← ⊥
16: Round ρ = 〈r, 3〉:
17: Sρp :
18: send 〈receivedp〉 to all
19: T ρp :
20: for all q ∈ Π do
21: if (~µρp[coord(r)][q] 6= ⊥) ∧∣∣{i ∈ Π : ~µρp[i][q] = ~µρp[coord(r)][q]}∣∣ ≥ t+ 1 then
22: ~Mp[q]← ~µρp[coord(r)][q]
23: else
24: ~Mp[q]← ⊥
and pi receives vali from p2.
Proposition 3. Algorithm 2 preserves Pint(r).
Proof. Let p, q be two correct processes. Assume for
a contradiction that Srp(s
r
p) = v, ~Mq[p] = v
′, where
v′ 6= v, v′ 6= ⊥. Therefore, by line 21, we have
|{i : ~µρq [i][p] = v′}| ≥ t + 1. Consequently, for at
least one correct process c we have ~µρq [c][p] = v′.
Element ~µρq [c][p] is the message received by c from
p in round 〈r, 1〉, which is received c[p]. However,
received c[p] = v′ is in contradiction with the assump-
tion that p and c are correct.
Proposition 4. If coord(r) is correct, then Algo-
rithm 2 translates Pgood into Pcons .
Proof. Let p, q be two correct processes, and s some
other process (not necessarily correct). Let c be the
correct coordinator. Let Pgood (〈r, 1〉), Pgood (〈r, 2〉)
and Pgood (〈r, 3〉) hold.
We first show (i) ~Mp[q] = Srq (s
r
q) , and then
(ii) ( ~Mp[s] = v 6= ⊥)⇒ ( ~Mq[s] = v). Note that from
(ii) it follows directly that ( ~Mp[s] = ⊥) ⇒ ( ~Mq[s] =
⊥).
(i): In micro-round 〈r, 1〉, process q sends v =
Srq (s
r
q) to all, and because of Pgood (〈r, 1〉), v is re-
ceived by all correct processes. For all those cor-
rect processes i, we have received i[q] = v (*). In
micro-round 〈r, 2〉, every correct process forwards v
to the coordinator c, and c receives all these messages.
Since n ≥ 3t + 1 there are at least 2t + 1 correct
processes. Therefore the condition of line 14 is false
for q because |{q′ ∈ Π : ~µρc [q′][q] = received c[q]}| ≥
2t + 1 , i.e., received c[q] is not set to ⊥. By
(*) above, we have received c[q] = v. Because
of Pgood (〈r, 3〉) all messages sent by correct pro-
cesses in micro-round 〈r, 3〉 are received by all cor-
rect processes. Thus, for p at line 21, we have
~µρp[coord(r)][q] 6= ⊥. Moreover, by (*), condition
|{i ∈ Π : ~µρp[i][q] = ~µρp[coord(r)][q]}| ≥ t+ 1 is true.
This leads p to execute line 22, i.e., assign v to ~Mp[q].
(ii): Let us assume ~Mp[s] = v 6= ⊥, and con-
sider Algorithm 2 from the point of view of p. Con-
sider the loop at line 20 for process s. By line 22,
we have ~µρp[coord(r)][s] = v. Since the coordina-
tor is correct, in order to have ~µρp[coord(r)][s] = v,
the condition of line 14 is true at c for process s, i.e.,
|{q′ ∈ Π : ~µρc [q′][s] = received c[s]}| ≥ 2t + 1. This
means that at least 2t+ 1 processes, including at least
t+ 1 correct processes, have received from s in micro-
round 〈r, 1〉 the same message that c received from s,
namely v (?). In micro-round 〈r, 3〉, these t+1 correct
processes send received to all. Because Pgood (〈r, 3〉)
holds, all these messages are received by q in round
〈r, 3〉 (??).
Consider now Algorithm 2 from the point of view
of q, and again the loop at line 20 for process s.
Since the coordinator is correct, it sends at line 18 the
same message to p and to q, i.e., at q we also have
~µρq [coord(r)][s] = v. By (?) and (??), the condition
|{i ∈ Π : ~µρq [i][s] = ~µρq [coord(r)][s]}| ≥ t+ 1 is true.
Therefore q executes line 22 with ~µρp[coord(r)][s] =
v.
5 Achieving Consensus with WIC
In this section we show how to express the con-
sensus algorithms of Castro-Liskov [4] and Martin-
Alivisi [12] using WIC. The algorithm of Castro and
Lisko solves a sequence of instances of consensus
(state machine replication). For simplicity, we con-
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sider only one instance of consensus.
Consensus is defined by agreement, termination and
a validity property. We consider two validity proper-
ties, weak and strong validity [7]:
Agreement. No two correct processes decide differ-
ently.
Termination. All correct processes eventually decide.
Weak Validity. If all processes are correct and if a cor-
rect process decides v, then v is the initial value
of some process.
Strong Validity. If all correct processes have the same
initial value v and a correct process decides, then
it decides v.
Both, [4] and [12] achieve only weak validity. Weak
validity allows correct processes to decide on the ini-
tial value of a Byzantine process. With strong valid-
ity, however, this is only possible if not all correct
processes have the same initial value. We give algo-
rithms for both, weak and strong validity, and show
that strong validity is in fact easy to ensure.
5.1 On the use of WIC
We express the algorithms of this section in the
round model defined in Section 3. All rounds of MA
and CL require Pint to hold. Some of the rounds
require Pcons to eventually hold. These rounds can
be simulated using, e.g., Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2.
We explicitly mention those rounds of MA and CL as
rounds “in which Pcons must eventually hold”. The
other rounds of MA and CL are ordinary rounds.
5.2 MA algorithm
The algorithm of Martin and Alvisi [12] is ex-
pressed in the context of “proposers”, “acceptors” and
“learners”. For simplicity, we express here consensus
without considering these roles.
We give two algorithms. The first solves consensus
with weak validity and is given as Algorithm 3. In the
first phase it corresponds to the “common case” pro-
tocol of [12]. All later phases correspond to the “re-
covery protocol” of [12] (cf. Algorithm 4). The sec-
ond algorithm solves consensus with strong validity,
and is even simpler: all phases are identical, see Algo-
rithm 4. In both algorithms, the notation #(v) is used
Algorithm 3 MA (weak validity)
1: Initialization:
2: xp ← vp ∈ V /* vp is p’s initial value */
3: Round r = 1:
4: Srp :
5: if p = coord then
6: send xp to all
7: T rp :
8: if ~µrp[coord ] 6= ⊥ then
9: xp ← ~µrp[coord ]
10: Round r = 2:
11: Srp :
12: send xp to all
13: T rp :
14: if ∃v¯ 6= ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ d(n+ 3t+ 1)/2e then
15: DECIDE v¯
16: Round r ≥ 3:
17: Same as Algorithm 4 without Initialization
Algorithm 4 MA (strong validity)
1: Initialization:
2: xp ← vp ∈ V /* vp is p’s initial value */
3: Round r = 2φ− 1: /* round in which Pcons must eventually hold
*/
4: Srp :
5: send xp to all
6: T rp :
7: if #(⊥) ≤ t then
8: xp ← min {v : 6 ∃v′ ∈ V s.t. #(v′) > #(v)}
9: Round r = 2φ:
10: Srp :
11: send xp to all
12: T rp :
13: if ∃v¯ 6= ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ d(n+ 3t+ 1)/2e then
14: DECIDE v¯
to denote the number of messages received with value
v, i.e., #(v) ≡ ∣∣{q ∈ Π : ~µrp[q] = v}∣∣.
For MA with weak validity, the first phase needs an
initial coordinator, which is denoted by coord . Note
that WIC is relevant only to rounds 2φ − 1, φ > 1,
of Algorithm 4. If rounds 2φ − 1 are simulated using
Algorithm 1, we get the original algorithm of [12]. If
rounds 2φ − 1 are simulated using Algorithm 2, we
get a new algorithm. In this new algorithm, similarly
to the algorithm in [12], fast decision is possible in
two rounds; however, signatures are not used in the
recovery protocol.
Both algorithms require n ≥ 5t + 1. Agree-
ment, weak validity and strong validity hold without
synchrony assumptions. Termination requires (i) one
phase φ such that Pcons(2φ − 1) holds, and (ii) one
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phase φ′ ≥ φ such that Pgood (2φ′) holds. 10
Theorem 1. If n ≥ 5t+ 1 then Algorithm 3 (resp. Al-
gorithm 4) ensures weak (resp. strong) validity and
agreement. Termination holds if in addition the fol-
lowing condition holds:
∃φ : Pcons(2φ− 1) ∧ ∃φ′ ≥ φ : Pgood (2φ′)
Proof.
The proofs for termination with strong and weak va-
lidity are the same, and the proofs for agreement are
almost identical. Weak validity is trivially satisfied.
Therefore, we prove only MA with strong validity (Al-
gorithm 4).
Agreement: Assume for a contradiction that pro-
cess p decides v in round r = 2φ, and process p′
decides v′ 6= v in round r′ = 2φ′. W.l.o.g. assume
φ′ ≥ φ.
If φ = φ′ then d(n+3t+1)/2e−t correct processes
have sent v to p and d(n+ 3t+ 1)/2e − t correct pro-
cesses have sent v′ to p′. Since 2(d(n+ 3t+ 1)/2e −
t)+t > n, there is one correct process q that has sent v
to p and v′ to p′. A contradiction with the assumption
that q is correct.
Else, we have φ′ > φ. By line 13, at least d(n+3t+
1)/2e − t correct processes p have xp = v at the end
of phase φ. We show now that for all phases φ′′ > φ,
every time line 8 is executed at some correct process
q, xq is updated only to v. By the condition of line 7, q
has received at least n− t values different from ⊥. In
any subset of size≥ n−t, at least d(n+3t+1)/2e−2t
values are v and at most n − d(n + 3t + 1)/2e + t
are 6= v; thus because of d(n + 3t + 1)/2e − 2t >
n − d(n + 3t + 1)/2e + t no value can occur more
often in ~µ than v.
Therefore, in all phases φ′′ > φ, at least d(n+ 3t+
1)/2e − t correct processes p have xp = v. It follows
directly that only v can be decided in these phases, and
thus also in φ′.
Strong validity: If n ≥ 3t+ 1, then n− t ≥ d(n+
3t+ 1)/2e − t. Therefore if all correct processes have
the same initial value v, we have initially at least d(n+
3t+1)/2e−t processes pwith xp = v. By an argument
used in the proof of agreement, only v can be decided.
10 For simplicity, we have not included a boolean to prevent a
process from deciding more than once, e.g., Algorithm 4, line 14.
Termination: Let φ0 be such that Pcons(2φ0 − 1)
holds. Therefore the condition of line 7 is true for all
correct processes. Moreover, Pcons(2φ0 − 1) ensures
that all correct processes p, when executing line 8, set
xp to the same value, say v. By an argument used in the
proof of agreement, after phase φ0, correct processes
p can only update xp to v at line 8.
Let φ′0 ≥ φ0 such that Pgood (2φ′0) holds. In round
2φ′0, n−t correct processes send v. If n ≥ 5t+1, then
n − t ≥ d(n + 3t + 1)/2e; therefore the condition of
line 13 is true for all correct processes, which decide
at line 14.
Note that n ≥ 5t+1 is only needed for termination,
while only n ≥ 3t + 1 is needed for agreement and
strong validity.
5.3 CL algorithm
The algorithm of Castro and Liskov [4] solves a se-
quence of instances of consensus (state machine repli-
cation). For simplicity, we consider only one instance
of consensus. As for MA, we give two algorithms.
The first solves consensus with weak validity and
is given as Algorithm 5. In the first phase it corre-
sponds to the “common case” protocol of [4]. All
later phases correspond to the “view change proto-
col” of [4] (cf. Algorithm 6). The second algorithm
solves consensus with strong validity, and is even sim-
pler: all phases are identical, see Algorithm 6. In
both algorithms, the notation #(v) is used to denote
the number of messages received with value v, i.e.,
#(v) ≡ ∣∣{q ∈ Π : ~µrp[q] = v}∣∣.
For CL with weak validity, the first phase needs
an initial coordinator, which is denoted by coord . In
round 1 of this phase the coordinator sends its initial
value to all. In round 2 every process that has received
the initial value from the coordinator in round 1 re-
sends this value to all. Every process p, upon receiv-
ing this value from at least d(n+ t+ 1)/2e processes,
updates votep and tVotep (lines 19 and 20), and then
sends votep to all in round 3. A process receiving in
round at least d(n+ t+ 1)/2emessages with the same
value v, decides v. For CL with weak validity, WIC
is relevant only to rounds 3φ − 2, φ > 1 (cf. Algo-
rithm 6). If rounds 3φ− 2, φ > 1 are simulated using
Algorithm 2, we get an algorithm close to the original
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Algorithm 5 CL (weak validity)
1: Initialization:
2: xp ← vp ∈ V /* vp is the initial value of p */
3: pre-votep ← ∅ /* see Algorithm 6 */
4: votep ← ⊥ /* see Algorithm 6 */
5: tVotep ← 0 /* see Algorithm 6 */
6: Round r = 3φ− 2 = 1:
7: Srp :
8: if p = coord then
9: send 〈xp〉 to all
10: T rp :
11: if ~µrp[coord] 6= ⊥ then
12: add (~µrp[coord], φ) to pre-votep
13: Round r = 3φ− 1 = 2:
14: Srp :
15: if ∃(v, φ) ∈ pre-votep then
16: send 〈v〉 to all
17: T rp :
18: if #(v) ≥ d(n+ t+ 1)/2e then
19: votep ← v
20: tVotep ← φ
21: Round r = 3φ = 3:
22: Srp :
23: if tVotep = φ then
24: send 〈votep〉 to all
25: T rp :
26: if ∃v¯ 6= ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ d(n+ t+ 1)/2e then
27: DECIDE v¯
28: Round r ≥ 4:
29: Same as Algorithm 6 without Initialization
algorithm of [4]. If rounds 3φ − 2, φ > 1 are simu-
lated using Algorithm 1, we get a variant of PBFT with
signatures.
CL with strong validity (see Algorithm 6) consists
of a sequence of phases φ, where each phase φ has
three rounds 3φ−2, 3φ−1 and 3φ. The role of the vari-
ables is explained in comments, see lines 2–5. WIC is
needed only in round 3φ − 2. Rounds 3φ − 1 and 3φ
are the same as rounds 2 and 3 of Algorithm 5. We ex-
plain now round 3φ− 2 by analyzing two scenarios in
a system with n = 4 and t = 1: (i) some correct pro-
cess has decided in a smaller phase, and (ii) no correct
process has decided in a smaller phase.
vote tVote pre-vote x
p1 v φ0 (v, φ0) v1
p2 v φ0 (v, φ0) v2
p3 v3 φ < φ0 (v3, φ) v3
p4 Byzantine process, voted for v in round 3φ0
Case (i): The following table shows a possible process
state at the end of phase φ0 in which p1 has decided v.
The table illustrates a scenario in which the Byzantine
process p4 has voted for value v (see line 36) in phase
φ0. We show that in round r = 3(φ0 + 1)− 2 of phase
φ0 + 1 process p4 cannot force some correct process,
say p3, to add (v′, φ0+1) to pre-votep3 for some value
v′ 6= v. This leads us to explain lines 15–24. Assume
that p3 receives exactly d(n+ t+ 1)/2e = 3 messages
in round r, and let mp4 = (v
′, φ1, (v′, φ1), v′) be the
message that is received by p3 from p4.
We first consider the condition of line 17 (taken
from [4]) for message mp4 . The first part of the con-
dition is true if a set of messages received by p3 con-
tains d(n + t + 1)/2e = 3 messages m such that (i)
mp4 .tVote > m.tVote , or (ii) mp4 .tVote = m.tVote
and mp4 .vote = m.vote . Since mp2 .vote = v, mes-
sage mp4 satisfies the first part of the condition at
line 17 only if mp4 .tVote > mp2 .tVote . Therefore,
the Byzantine process p4 can send a message with
vote 6= v that satisfies the first part of the condition
at line 17 by choosing tVote to be large enough. How-
ever, in that case the second part of the condition at
line 17 cannot be true. This is because for all correct
processes we have tVote ≤ φ0, while the second part
of the condition at line 17 requires t+1 messages with
tVote > φ0, i.e., at least one message from a correct
process.
The above explanations are related to agreement.
Next, we explain why termination holds if some pro-
cess has decided in phase φ0. Assume that Pcons(r)
holds. In this case p1, p2, p3 receive in round r the
messages from p1, p2, p3 (p1,p2 and p3 are correct pro-
cesses). Therefore, the condition at line 17 is true at
p1, p2 and p3 for these three messages with vote = v
and tVote = φ0. As a result, p1, p2 and p3 add
(v, φ0 + 1) to their pre-vote at line 20. Now, pred-
icates Pgood (r + 1) and Pgood (r + 2) allow correct
processes to decide v in round r + 2.11
Case (ii): We assume here that no correct process
has decided in a smaller round, and thatPcons(r) holds
for round r = 3φ − 2. In this case p1, p2, p3 re-
ceive in round r the messages from p1, p2, p3. More-
over, if one of these processes receive in round r the
message from p4, then all of them receive this mes-
sage. Therefore p1, p2 and p3 evaluate the condition
at line 17 on the same set of messages. As a result
11Footnote 10, page 9.
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Algorithm 6 CL (strong validity)
1: Initialization:
2: xp ← vp ∈ V /* vp is the initial value of p */
3: pre-votep ← ∅ /* set of pairs (v, φ), where φ is the phase in which value v is added to the pre-votep set */
4: votep ← ⊥ /* the most recent vote */
5: tVotep ← 0 /* phase in which votep was last updated */
6: Procedure pre-votep.add(v, φ) :
7: if ∃(v, φ′) ∈ pre-votep then
8: remove (v, φ′) from pre-votep
9: add (v, φ) to pre-votep
10: Round r = 3φ− 2: /* round in which Pcons must eventually hold */
11: Srp :
12: send 〈votep, tVotep, pre-votep, xp〉 to all
13: T rp :
14: proposalsp ← ∅ ; Ip ← ∅ /* temporary variables */
15: if ~µrp contains at least d(n+ t+ 1)/2e messages 〈vote, tVote, pre-vote, x〉 then
16: for all m ∈ ~µrp do
17: if
∣∣{m′ ∈ ~µrp : (m′.tVote < m.tVote) ∨ (m′.tVote = m.tVote ∧m′.vote = m.vote)}∣∣ ≥ d(n+ t+ 1)/2e and∣∣{m′ ∈ ~µrp : ∃(v, φ′) ∈ m′.pre-vote s.t. φ′ ≥ m.tVote ∧ v = m.vote}∣∣ ≥ t+ 1} then
18: proposalsp ← proposalsp ∪m.vote
19: if
∣∣proposalsp∣∣ > 0 then
20: pre-votep.add(min(proposalsp), φ)
21: else if exist at least d(n+ t+ 1)/2e messages m′ ∈ ~µrp : m′.vote = ⊥ then
22: Ip ←
{
m.x s.t. m ∈ ~µrp
}
23: x← min {v : 6 ∃v′ ∈ Ip s.t. #(v′) > #(v)}
24: pre-votep.add(x, φ)
25: Round r = 3φ− 1:
26: Srp :
27: if ∃(v, φ) ∈ pre-votep then
28: send 〈v〉 to all
29: T rp :
30: if #(v) ≥ d(n+ t+ 1)/2e then
31: votep ← v
32: tVotep ← φ
33: Round r = 3φ:
34: Srp :
35: if tVotep = φ then
36: send 〈votep〉 to all
37: T rp :
38: if ∃v¯ 6= ⊥ : #(v¯) ≥ d(n+ t+ 1)/2e then
39: DECIDE v¯
the condition at line 19 evaluates to the same value at
p1, p2 and p3. If this condition is true, then p1, p2
and p3 add (min(proposals), φ) to their pre-vote at
line 20, where min(proposals) is the same value for
all three processes. Else, p1, p2 and p3 add (x, φ) to
their pre-vote at line 24, where x is the same value
for all three processes. Now, predicates Pgood (r + 1)
and Pgood (r + 2) allow correct processes to decide v
in round r + 2.
Both algorithms (CL with weak validity and CL
with strong validity) require n ≥ 3t + 1. Agree-
ment, weak validity and strong validity hold without
synchrony assumptions. Termination requires (i) one
phase φ such that Pcons(3φ − 2), Pgood (3φ − 1) and
Pgood (3φ) hold.
5.4 Proof
Theorem 2. If n ≥ 3t+ 1 then Algorithm 5 (resp. Al-
gorithm 6) ensures weak (resp. strong) validity and
agreement. Termination holds if in addition the fol-
lowing condition holds:
∃φ : Pcons(3φ− 2) ∧ Pgood (3φ− 1) ∧ Pgood (3φ).
The proofs for termination with strong and weak va-
lidity are the same, and the proofs for agreement are
almost identical. Weak validity is trivially satisfied.
Therefore, we prove only CL with strong validity (Al-
gorithm 6).
11
The result follows from the proof of agreement,
strong validity and termination. We start with two def-
initions.
Definition 1. Correct process p has pre-prepared
value v in phase φ if (v, φ) ∈ pre-votep at the end
of phase φ.
Definition 2. Correct process p has prepared value v
in some phase φ if votep = v and tVotep = φ at the
end of phase φ.
(b1) Proof of agreement
Agreement follows from the following three lemmas.
Lemma 1. For all t ≥ 0, any two sets of size d(n+ t+
1)/2e have at least one correct process in common.
Proof. We have 2d(n + t + 1)/2e ≥ n + t + 1. This
means that the intersection of two sets of size d(n +
t+ 1)/2e contains at least t+ 1 processes, i.e., at least
one correct process. The result follows directly from
this.
Lemma 2. If some correct process q decides v in
phase φ0, then in all phases φ > φ0, all correct pro-
cesses can only pre-prepare value v.
Proof. We proof the result by induction on φ.
Base step φ = φ0 + 1 : Assume by contradiction
that p is some correct process that pre-prepares v′ 6= v
in phase φ0 + 1. This implies that either (i) line 20 or
(ii) line 24 was executed by p in phase φ0 + 1 where
v′ was pre-prepared by p.
For (ii), the conditions of line 15 and line 21 have
both to be true. If the condition of line 15 is true, this
implies that ~µrp contains at least d(n+ t+ 1)/2e mes-
sages. Since q has decided in phase φ0, q received at
least d(n + t + 1)/2e messages with v at line 38. All
correct processes c who sent a message with v have
prepared v in phase φ0 (see lines 31, 32 and 35), i.e.,
votec = v and tVotec = φ0. Let us denote this set of
correct processes with Qc. By Lemma 1 the intersec-
tion of two sets of size d(n+t+1)/2e contains at least
one correct process. Therefore, in the d(n+ t+ 1)/2e
messages received (line 15) there is at least one mes-
sage sent by process from Qc, i.e., the condition at
line 21 cannot be true. So line 20 (case (i)) was ex-
ecuted by p.
For (i), the conditions at line 15, line 17 and line 19
have to be true. We show that if the condition at
line 15 is true, and the first part of the condition at
line 17 is true, then the second part of the condi-
tion at line 17 is false, which establishes the con-
tradiction. Let us denote by mv′ the message that
leads p to pre-prepare v′ 6= v, i.e., mv′ ∈ ~µrp and
mv′ .vote = v′. By Lemma 1, ~µrp at line 16 contains
at least one message m′ sent by a process in Qc, i.e.,
m′.vote = v and m′.tVote = φ0. So the first part
of the condition at line 17 can only be true for mv′ if∣∣{m′ ∈ ~µrp : (m′.tVote < mv′ .tVote)}∣∣ ≥ d(n+t+
1)/2e. This holds only if mv′ .tVote > φ0 (*), since
(as shown above) any set of size d(n+ t+ 1)/2e con-
tains at least one message m sent by a process in Qc,
i.e., m.tVote = φ0.
The second part of the condition at line 17, because
of the condition ≥ t + 1, can only be true for mv′ if
there is a message m in ~µrp sent by a correct process c
such that: (v, φ) ∈ pre-votec (**) and φ ≥ mv′ .tVote
and v = mv′ .vote . However, for any correct process
c, if (v, φ) ∈ pre-votec, then φ ≤ φ0 (***). From (**)
and (***) we get φ0 ≥ mv′ .tVote: a contradiction
with mv′ .tVote > φ0, see (*).
Induction step from φ to φ + 1: Arguments similar
to the base step can be used to prove the induction step.
Lemma 3. If v is the only value that can be pre-
prepared by correct processes in phase φ, then v is
the only value that can be prepared in phase φ.
Proof. If v is the only value that can be pre-prepared
by correct processes in phase φ, then v is the only
value that can be sent by correct process at line 28 in
phase φ. Because there are at most t Byzantine pro-
cesses, and t < d(n + t + 1)/2e, for all correct pro-
cesses holds that if exists some value that satisfies the
condition at line 30, then it must be v. So v is the
only value that can be prepared by correct processes at
line 31 in phase φ.
Proposition 5. Algorithm 6 ensures agreement if n ≥
3t+ 1.
Proof. Let φ0 be the first phase in which some correct
process decides v. Since t < n/3, line 38 ensures that
another correct process that decides in phase φ0 also
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decides v. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, in all phases
φ > φ0, all correct processes can only set votep to v.
So in round r = 3φ, correct processes cannot decide a
value different from v.
(b2) Proof of strong validity
Strong validity follows from the following two lem-
mas.
Lemma 4. If n ≥ 3t+1, then any set of d(n+t+1)/2e
processes contains a majority of correct processes.
Proof. We have d(n+ t+ 1)/2e ≥ (n+ t+ 1)/2. If
n ≥ 3t+1, then (n+ t+1)/2 ≥ (3t+1+ t+1)/2 =
2t+ 1. Therefore, d(n+ t+ 1)/2e ≥ 2t+ 1.
Lemma 5. If all correct processes have the same ini-
tial value v, then in all phases φ, v is the only value
that can be pre-prepared by correct processes.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that φ is the first
round where a value different from v is pre-prepared
at some correct process p. This implies that either (i)
line 20 or (ii) line 24 was executed. By assumtion, we
have (v,−−) ∈ pre-votep or pre-votep = ∅.
For (i), line 19, line 17 and line 15 have to be true.
If pre-votep = ∅, the second part of the condition at
line 17 is always false. If pre-votep 6= ∅, only values
(v,−−) are in pre-votep, and thus the second part of
the condition at line 17 can be true only for message
m ∈ ~µrp such that m.vote = v.
For (ii), line 24 is executed, i.e., the conditions at
line 21 and line 15 have to be true. This means that
~µrp contains at least d(n + t + 1)/2e messages. By
Lemma 4, there is a majority of messages sent by cor-
rect processes in ~µrp. Since all correct processes have
the same initial value v, x is set to v at line 23, and p
pre-prepares v.
So v is the only value that can be pre-prepared by
correct processes in phase φ. Contradiction.
Proposition 6. If n ≥ 3t + 1, Algorithm 6 ensures
strong validity.
Proof. Assume that all correct processes have the
same initial value v. By Lemma 5, v is the only
value that can be pre-prepared by correct processes.
By Lemma 3, v is the only value that can be prepared
by correct processes. Therefore, v is the only value
that can be sent by correct processes at line 36 (*). If
n > t, we have d(n+t+1)/2e > t (**). From (*) and
(**), it follows that the condition at line 38 can only be
true for v, i.e., v is the only value that can be decided
at line 39.
(b3) Proof of termination
Proposition 7. If n ≥ 3t+ 1 and
∃φ0 : Pcons(3φ0−2)∧Pgood (3φ0−1)∧Pgood (3φ0),
then Algorithm 6 ensures termination.
Proof. Predicate Pcons(3φ0−2) ensures that, in round
3φ0−2, for any two correct processes p and q, we have
~µrp = ~µ
r
q, with at least n − t messages in ~µrp (1). If
n ≥ 3t + 1, we have n − t ≥ d(n + t + 1)/2e (2).
(1) and (2) ensure that the condition of line 15 is true
at each correct process in phase φ0.
Part A: We prove that all correct processes will pre-
prepare the same value at line 20 or 24 in phase φ0.
There are two cases to consider: (i) some correct pro-
cess prepared a value in some phase smaller than φ0,
or (ii) there is no such process.
Case (i): Let φ < φ0 be the largest phase in which
some correct process prepared some value v (line 31).
By the condition of line 30, if n > t then all correct
processes that prepare a value in phase φ, prepare the
same value v. If n ≥ 3t + 1, we have n − t ≥ d(n +
t+ 1)/2e. It follows that in case (i) the first part of the
condition at line 17 holds for at least one message m
(3).
We consider now the second part (i.e., the second
line) of that condition. If n ≥ 3t + 1, we have d(n +
t + 1)/2e − t ≥ t + 1. Therefore if p prepares v
in phase φ, by the condition of line 30, at least t + 1
correct processes have pre-prepared v in phase φ. If
v is pre-prepared by p in phase φ, then v stays pre-
prepared by p (see lines 7–9). Therefore the second
part of the condition at line 17 holds for at least one
message m (4).
From (3) and (4), it follows that the condition of
line 19 is true at all correct processes in phase φ0.
Moreover, predicate Pcons(3φ0 − 2) ensures that for
two correct processes p and q, we have proposalsp =
proposalsq. Therefore p and q pre-prepare the same
value at line 20.
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Case (ii): By hypothesis, for all correct processes p,
we have votep = ⊥. Predicate Pcons(3φ− 2) ensures
that ~µrp contains the message of all correct processes. If
n ≥ 3t+1, we have n−t ≥ d(n+t+1)/2e. Therefore
the condition at line 21 is true at each correct process.
Moreover, since for any two correct process p and q
we have ~µrp = ~µ
r
q, all correct processes will assign the
same value to x (line 23), and pre-prepare the same
value at line 24.
Part B: From Part A, there exists a value v such
that all correct processes p have (v, φ0) ∈ pre-votep
at the beginning of round 3φ0 − 1. Therefore all cor-
rect processes send v to all at line 28. The predicate
Pgood (3φ0 − 1) ensures that all correct processes re-
ceive all these messages, set votep to v (line 31), and
send v to all at line 36. The predicate Pgood (3φ0) en-
sures that all correct processes receive all these mes-
sages, and decide at line 39 in phase φ0.
5.4.1 CL vs. PBFT
As mentioned in Section 1, replacing in CL round
3φ− 2 with a signature-free WIC implementation ba-
sically leads to the original signature-free PBFT algo-
rithm. There are a few differences.
1. CL assumes n ≥ 3t + 1 while PBFT assumes
for simplicity n = 3t + 1. This explains why
d(n + t + 1)/2e appears in CL instead of 2t + 1
in PBFT.
2. In PBFT a process p may wait for more the n− t
messages. This happens each time p can know,
based on the content of messages, that it received
messages from Byzantine processes. Indeed, if p
knows that x messages are from Byzantine pro-
cesses, and since channels are reliable, it is safe
for p to wait for n−(t−x) messages. Such mech-
anism in which a process looks at the content of
the message is not needed in CL.
3. In PFBT the decision can be on a special ”null”
value, while in CL the decision is always on a
“real” value.
4. Consider finally round 3φ − 2 of CL, and our
signature-free implementation of WIC, see Fig-
ure 4 and Algorithm 2. Messages of round 〈r, 1〉
basically correspond to the “view-change” mes-
sages of PBFT. Messages of round 〈r, 2〉 basi-
cally correspond to the “view-change-ack” mes-
sages of PBFT. The difference is in round 〈r, 3〉:
(i) in PBFT only the coordinator (p1 in Figure 4)
sends its message, say m〈r,3〉p1 , and piggybacks on
it the hashes of the messages p1 received in round
〈r, 1〉. Let p2 receive m〈r,3〉p1 . If m〈r,3〉p1 piggybacks
the hash of some message m〈r,1〉p3 that is not re-
ceived by p2 in round 〈r, 1〉, then p2 sends a re-
quest to getm〈r,1〉p3 . If p3 is Byzantine, it might not
resend the message. Therefore the coordinator re-
sends the requested message, and the correct pro-
cesses that has received this message will resend
a “view-change-ack” message. Process p2 can ac-
cept the message if it receives t corresponding
“view-change-ack” messages. This “pull” strat-
egy avoids sending messages that are not needed.
For simplicity, we did not include such an opti-
mization in CL.
6 Related work
Unification To the best of our knowledge, there
is little work that has tried to unify algorithms for
Byzantine faults that use signatures and algorithms
that do not use signatures. We are only aware of the
work of Skrikanth and Toueg [16] related to authenti-
cated broadcast (as already mentioned in Section 1).12
Further there is the work of Neiger and Toueg [13]
who have developed methods to automatically trans-
late protocols tolerant of benign faults to ones toler-
ant of more severe faults, including Byzantine faults,
in the context of synchronous systems. Abstractions
introduced by Lampson in [11] are relevant only to
PBFT [4], and its hard to see how these abstractions
can be extended to other Byzantine consensus proto-
cols. Orthogonal to our approach, [2] proposes a solu-
tion for implementing digital signatures using MACs
(message authentication codes).
Byzantine consensus algorithms Several models
with Byzantine faults have been considered for solving
consensus or closely related problems, such as Byzan-
tine agreement or state machine replication. The early
12Authenticated broadcast is also sometimes called consis-
tent broadcast. For some authors, consistent broadcast provides
weaker guarantees than authenticated broadcast.
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work of Lamport, Shostak and Pease [14, 10] con-
siders a synchronous system and proposes algorithms
for Interactive Consistency and Byzantine agreement
with and without signatures. A weaker system model,
namely partial synchrony, has been considered by
Dwork, Lynch and Stockmeyer [7]. This is also the
model we consider in this paper. In [7], the au-
thors propose two consensus algorithms for Byzantine
faults: one that uses signatures, and one without sig-
natures. In [1], the authors consider a system with less
synchrony than provided by partially synchrony, and
describe a consensus algorithm that does not use sig-
natures. Randomized consensus can be solved in an
asynchronous system with Byzantine faults, as shown
first in [3]. In [5], the authors solve consensus with
Byzantine faults assuming a system equipped with a
Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB).
Our CL algorithm is a simplified version of PBFT.
Other authors have tried to increase the efficiency of
PBFT, e.g. [8]. Recently, [15] has proposed a consen-
sus algorithm for Byzantine faults that ensures strong
validity, in which the decision is possible in the first
round.
7 Conclusion
The paper has introduced the weak interactive con-
sistency (or WIC) abstraction, and has shown that WIC
allows to unify Byzantine consensus algorithms with
and without signatures. This has been illustrated on
two seminal Byzantine consensus algorithm, namely
on the FaB Paxos algorithm [12] and on the PBFT al-
gorithm [4]. In both cases this leads to a very concise
algorithm. Apart from these two algorithms, we also
managed to express two other algorithms for Byzan-
tine faults using WIC: the algorithms for Byzantine
faults of [7] and a deterministic version of the algo-
rithm for Byzantine faults of [3], which is the basis
for the algorithm in [1]. Therefore, we conjecture that
WIC is the abstraction that underlines all Byzantine
consensus algorithms for partial synchronous systems.
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